Higher media multi-tasking activity is associated with smaller gray-matter density in the anterior cingulate cortex

Media multitasking, or the concurrent consumption of multiple media forms, is increasingly prevalent in today’s society and has been associated with negative psychosocial and cognitive impacts. Individuals who engage in heavier media-multitasking are found to perform worse on cognitive control tasks and exhibit more socio-emotional difficulties. However, the neural processes associated with media multi-tasking remain unexplored. The present study investigated relationships between media multitasking activity and brain structure. Research has demonstrated that brain structure can be altered upon prolonged exposure to novel environments and experience. Thus, we expected differential engagements in media multitasking to correlate with brain structure variability. This was confirmed via Voxel-Based Morphometry (VBM) analyses: Individuals with higher Media Multitasking Index (MMI) scores had smaller gray matter density in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Functional connectivity between this ACC region and the precuneus was negatively associated with MMI. Our findings suggest a possible structural correlate for the observed decreased cognitive control performance and socio-emotional regulation in heavy media-multitaskers. While the cross-sectional nature of our study does not allow us to specify the direction of causality, our results brought to light novel associations between individual media multitasking behaviors and ACC structure differences

Under pressure: Response urgency modulates striatal and insula activity during decision-making under risk

When deciding whether to bet in situations that involve potential monetary loss or gain (mixed gambles), a subjective sense of pressure can influence the evaluation of the expected utility associated with each choice option. Here, we explored how gambling decisions, their psychophysiological and neural counterparts are modulated by an induced sense of urgency to respond. Urgency influenced decision times and evoked heart rate responses, interacting with the expected value of each gamble. Using functional MRI, we observed that this interaction was associated with changes in the activity of the striatum, a critical region for both reward and choice selection, and within the insula, a region implicated as the substrate of affective feelings arising from interoceptive signals which influence motivational behavior. Our findings bridge current psychophysiological and neurobiological models of value representation and action-programming, identifying the striatum and insular cortex as the key substrates of decision-making under risk and urgency

Imbalanced decision hierarchy in addicts emerging from drug-hijacked dopamine spiraling circuit

Despite explicitly wanting to quit, long-term addicts find themselves powerless to resist drugs, despite knowing that drug-taking may be a harmful course of action. Such inconsistency between the explicit knowledge of negative consequences and the compulsive behavioral patterns represents a cognitive/behavioral conflict that is a central characteristic of addiction. Neurobiologically, differential cue-induced activity in distinct striatal subregions, as well as the dopamine connectivity spiraling from ventral striatal regions to the dorsal regions, play critical roles in compulsive drug seeking. However, the functional mechanism that integrates these neuropharmacological observations with the above-mentioned cognitive/behavioral conflict is unknown. Here we provide a formal computational explanation for the drug-induced cognitive inconsistency that is apparent in the addicts' “self-described mistake”. We show that addictive drugs gradually produce a motivational bias toward drug-seeking at low-level habitual decision processes, despite the low abstract cognitive valuation of this behavior. This pathology emerges within the hierarchical reinforcement learning framework when chronic exposure to the drug pharmacologically produces pathologicaly persistent phasic dopamine signals. Thereby the drug hijacks the dopaminergic spirals that cascade the reinforcement signals down the ventro-dorsal cortico-striatal hierarchy. Neurobiologically, our theory accounts for rapid development of drug cue-elicited dopamine efflux in the ventral striatum and a delayed response in the dorsal striatum. Our theory also shows how this response pattern depends critically on the dopamine spiraling circuitry. Behaviorally, our framework explains gradual insensitivity of drug-seeking to drug-associated punishments, the blocking phenomenon for drug outcomes, and the persistent preference for drugs over natural rewards by addicts. The model suggests testable predictions and beyond that, sets the stage for a view of addiction as a pathology of hierarchical decision-making processes. This view is complementary to the traditional interpretation of addiction as interaction between habitual and goal-directed decision systems

No Evidence That Gratitude Enhances Neural Performance Monitoring or Conflict-Driven Control

It has recently been suggested that gratitude can benefit self-regulation by reducing impulsivity during economic decision making. We tested if comparable benefits of gratitude are observed for neural performance monitoring and conflict-driven self-control. In a pre-post design, 61 participants were randomly assigned to either a gratitude or happiness condition, and then performed a pre-induction flanker task. Subsequently, participants recalled an autobiographical event where they had felt grateful or happy, followed by a post-induction flanker task. Despite closely following existing protocols, participants in the gratitude condition did not report elevated gratefulness compared to the happy group. In regard to self-control, we found no association between gratitude--operationalized by experimental condition or as a continuous predictor--and any control metric, including flanker interference, post-error adjustments, or neural monitoring (the error-related negativity, ERN). Thus, while gratitude might increase economic patience, such benefits may not generalize to conflict-driven control processes

Confirmation bias in the utilization of others' opinion strength

Humans tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgments. This confirmation bias has significant impact on domains ranging from politics to science and education. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this fundamental characteristic of belief formation. Here we report a mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. Specifically, we provide evidence for a failure to use the strength of others' disconfirming opinions to alter confidence in judgments, but adequate use when opinions are confirmatory. This bias is related to reduced neural sensitivity to the strength of others' opinions in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex when opinions are disconfirming. Our results demonstrate that existing judgments alter the neural representation of information strength, leaving the individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement

The statistical neuroanatomy of frontal networks in the macaque

We were interested in gaining insight into the functional properties of frontal networks based upon their anatomical inputs. We took a neuroinformatics approach, carrying out maximum likelihood hierarchical cluster analysis on 25 frontal cortical areas based upon their anatomical connections, with 68 input areas representing exterosensory, chemosensory, motor, limbic, and other frontal inputs. The analysis revealed a set of statistically robust clusters. We used these clusters to divide the frontal areas into 5 groups, including ventral-lateral, ventral-medial, dorsal-medial, dorsal-lateral, and caudal-orbital groups. Each of these groups was defined by a unique set of inputs. This organization provides insight into the differential roles of each group of areas and suggests a gradient by which orbital and ventral-medial areas may be responsible for decision-making processes based on emotion and primary reinforcers, and lateral frontal areas are more involved in integrating affective and rational information into a common framework

Affective Influences without Approach-Avoidance Actions: On the Congruence Between Valence and Stimulus-Response Mappings

The valence of stimuli can influence performance in the spatial stimulus–response compatibility task, but this observation could arise from the process of selecting responses or selecting stimulus–response mappings. The response-selection account proposes that spatial compatible and incompatible keypress responses serve as approaching and avoiding actions to a valenced target. The mapping-selection account suggests that there is congruence between stimulus valence and stimulus–response mappings; positive-compatible/negative-incompatible is more congruent than negative-compatible/positive-incompatible. Whereas affective valence was part of the target stimuli to which participants responded in previous studies, the present study isolated affective valence from the target by presenting an additional mapping cue separately from the target, so that spatially compatible and incompatible keypress responses could no longer serve as approaching and avoiding actions to valenced target stimuli. The present results revealed that responses were still faster when positive and negative mapping cues were assigned to the spatially compatible and incompatible mappings than when the assignment was reversed. The finding supports the mapping-selection account, indicating that positive and negative cues influence performance without approach–avoidance actions to valenced stimuli. The experiment provides important implications as to how tasks are represented and are dependent on affective processing

How a co-actor’s task affects monitoring of own errors: evidence from a social event-related potential study

Efficient flexible behavior requires continuous monitoring of performance for possible deviations from the intended goal of an action. This also holds for joint action. When jointly performing a task, one needs to not only know the other’s goals and intentions but also generate behavioral adjustments that are dependent on the other person’s task. Previous studies have shown that in joint action people not only represent their own task but also the task of their co-actor. The current study investigated whether these so-called shared representations affect error monitoring as reflected in the response-locked error-related negativity (Ne/ERN) following own errors. Sixteen pairs of participants performed a social go/no-go task, while EEG and behavioral data were obtained. Responses were compatible or incompatible relative to the go/no-go action of the co-actor. Erroneous responses on no-go stimuli were examined. The results demonstrated increased Ne/ERN amplitudes and longer reaction times following errors on compatible compared to incompatible no-go stimuli. Thus, Ne/ERNs were larger after errors on trials that did not require a response from the co-actor either compared to errors on trials that did require a response from the co-actor. As the task of the other person is the only difference between these two types of errors, these findings show that people also represent their co-actor’s task during error monitoring in joint action. An extension of existing models on performance monitoring in individual action is put forward to explain the current findings in joint action. Importantly, we propose that inclusion of a co-actor’s task in performance monitoring may facilitate adaptive behavior in social interactions enabling fast anticipatory and corrective actions